This paper combines nationally representative household survey data from Zambia in 2006, with detailed, spatially disaggregated, price data, to simulate the likely welfare impacts of the prices changes arising from the food, fuel and financial crises between 2006 and 2009. We find that urban households, particularly the poorest, were very hard hit by both the rises in food prices in 2008 and in non-food prices in 2009. However, agricultural households in rural areas generally benefited from the food price rises. The key determinant of impact was whether a household is a net producer or a net consumer of food. Our results are robust to a wide range of assumptions about wage changes over the period. However, the poor quality of data on wages and non-farm business income make it impossible to provide a definitive account of welfare changes.
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Introduction
The recent financial crisis has led to an outpouring of literature on the impact on developing countries (see Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 2009; IMF 2009; Mendoza 2009; Naude 2009; ODI 2009; World Bank 2009 ). Much of this work has focused on the macroeconomic impact given the ready availability of such data. Studies have shown large variations in impact, from the relatively mild (much of South and some larger East Asian economies, Latin America, and several African countries (World Bank 2010) to the quite severe (several Eastern European and Central Asian countries and economies heavily specialised on trade, such as Singapore).
Notwithstanding this variation, the overall conclusion of much of the literature has been that developing countries have generally been less hard hit than richer nations. In particular, many African countries appear to have been resilient to the shocks that they have faced (AfDB 2010) The conclusion that countries have been less affected is generally drawn from macroeconomic data. The literature on previous crises, including the East Asian crisis in the late 1990s, should lead us to expect that the impacts on different groups within countries will be highly heterogeneous (Frankenberg et al. 1999; Lokshin and Ravallion 2000; Mendoza 2009 ). In particular, they depend on the pathways through which the shock is transmitted, and the sources of income and patterns of expenditure of different groups within society (McCulloch, et al. 2003) .
Assessing the welfare impact of the crisis therefore requires microeconomic data. Ideally, such data should be available as a panel of households from both before and after the shock, but inevitably very few countries have such data. Indeed very few countries even have crosssectional household data covering the period of the crisis (McCulloch and Grover 2010) . For the vast majority of countries, all that is available is a household survey often collected some years prior to the 2008/2009 financial crisis.
There are two ways of responding to this difficulty. First, some authors construct computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to estimate the impact of the shock, disaggregating the household sector as far as possible using the existing household survey data (Gutierrez, et al. 2010) . Such models have the strong advantages of consistency (by definition) with the macroeconomic data, as well as the ability to specify precisely the nature of the shock. However, the results from such models are critically dependent on the quality of the underlying database and the behavioural assumptions of the model. An alternative approach, taken here, is to estimate the welfare impact by combining high frequency, spatially disaggregated price data with the existing household survey data. This microsimulation approach has the strong advantage that it uses the prices actually faced by households across the country to determine impact. However, prices can change for many reasons, often unrelated to the financial crisis. Moreover, price changes occur continuously from the time when the previous survey was undertaken to the present. Therefore this approach estimates the combined effect of the various shocks which have taken place since the initial survey. This paper attempts to use this direct approach to estimate the impact of the shocks faced by Zambian households between 2006 and 2009. Zambians were subject to several major shocks during this period consisting of the fuel and food crisis shocks of 2008, followed by financial crisis and associated commodity price collapse at the end of 2008 and subsequent recovery during 2009. In addition, food prices are influenced significantly by patterns of rainfall and their effect on the harvest.
To preview our results, we find that there has been huge disparity between the impact of price changes on rural and urban households. Whilst rural households have gained slightly overall from rising prices, reflecting their strong net producer status, urban households have been hard hit. The largest impact on welfare has come from the effect of rapidly rising prices on the urban population during 2008, prior to the onset of the global financial crisis, although welfare for the urban population continued to deteriorate in 2009. Conversely, analysis suggests that welfare improved for the rural population until 2009, when rising non-food prices reversed some of the welfare gains. Although this overall pattern of results is robust to a range of sensitivity tests, we find that the absolute value of the impact on the urban population is sensitive to assumptions about the rate of wage increases over the period.
Our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the macroeconomic and policy developments between late 2006 and the end of 2009 and discusses the pathways through which these may have affected households. Section 3 and 4 describe our methodology and the data, respectively. Section 5 describes the price shocks experienced by households, and shows the income sources and expenditure patterns of the population. It then lays out our estimates of the welfare impact of the changes observed. Section 6 concludes.
Macroeconomic Context
Zambia's economy has been doing well in recent years. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth between 2003-2008 was 5.7 per cent, the highest sustained rate of growth for over 30 years. In large part this has been driven by the surge of investment that followed the privatisation of the mines in 2000. Zambia's economy is still strongly dependent upon copper and cobalt which comprise 74 per cent of export revenue (calculated using CSO Zambia (2010)). As a result the macroeconomic performance of the country is heavily influenced by the world price of copper. Copper production in Zambia was in long-term decline from the mid-1970s until the end of the 1990s, as low world prices and inefficiency in the nationalised mines led to worsening performance. This trend was reversed in 2000 when the mines were privatised, and since 2000 there has been a surge of private investment into the mining sector which has rapidly increased output. Separately, the world price of copper rose by 190 per cent between 2003 and 2008, as burgeoning demand from newly emerging economies boosted prices.
The run up of commodity prices since 2003 came to an end in mid 2008 as the spread of the subprime crisis gave rise to a loss of confidence and a dramatic fall in copper prices. The copper price fell from $8407 per tonne in July 2008 to a low of $3105 in December. As a result one mine closed and others were put into care and maintenance. An estimated 8100 jobs were lost in the Copperbelt (Ndulo et al. 2009 ). Also the performance of the mines has a spillover effect on other aspects of the economy, since much of the manufacturing sector and many services exist to provide inputs to the mining sector. In addition formal sector mine workers are often indirectly responsible for supporting up to 20 other members of the extended family (Green 2009 ), so the loss of mine jobs can have a major negative impact on the communities in the mining areas. It is nonetheless important to put this shock into a broader context. Zambia has two types of mines -new mines resulting from the major investments of recent years which are low cost but highly capital intensive and which therefore employ relatively few people; and older mines which are higher cost and more labour intensive. As a result of major recent investments coming into operation in 2008 -notably the enormous Lumwana Mine in Solwezi -copper production actually increased even as the price of copper was collapsing in late 2008. It therefore seems likely that the industry used the opportunity of the crisis to close down uneconomical mines and to reduce costs. Moreover, the copper price has steadily risen since the initial shock so that by December 2009 it was back to $6977 per tonne. This has allowed the new and more efficient mines to expand employment, but, because they are more capital intensive, only around 1500 jobs have been created (Government of Zambia 2009).
Aside from the direct impact of job losses on households, the main channel through which copper prices influence households is through its affect on the exchange rate (Figure 2 
Fiscal Space
Other developments have also helped to provide macroeconomic stability and growth. In particular Zambia's efforts to meet the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Countries Initiative (HIPC) completion point through the establishment of fiscal discipline resulted in a one-off cancellation of most of its external debt. Fiscal deficits which averaged over 10 per cent of GDP in the 1970s and 1980s and 6 per cent in the 1990s, were brought down to 2.9 per cent in 2004 and have stayed below that level ever since. The resulting reduction in interest rates coupled with the debt reduction and increased revenue from mining led to an increase in fiscal space of 4.1 per cent of GDP between and 2007 (Whitworth pers. comm. 2010 ).
In addition, Zambia was one of the key beneficiaries of the agreement to issue Special Drawing Rights (SDR) in response to the financial crisis. It received $630 million worth of SDRs bolstering reserves to 4.3 months of import cover.
Balance of payments
The investments in the mining sector are now leading to substantial increases in copper production. This combined with the boom in prices up to 2008 lifted exports to US$ 4.7 billion in 2007, 6 times more than in 2000 (EIU Country Profile 2008). There have also been strong increases in exports of cotton, sugar, gemstones, horticulture and floriculture. Imports have also grown strongly, particularly of machinery and transportation equipment for mining. In addition, repeated disruptions from the Indeni refinery in Ndola have necessitated importing refined petroleum products, adding to the import bill (see below). 
Methodology
There is a large literature on the use of household surveys to measure the impact of major economic shocks (Benjamin and Deaton 1993; Ravallion 1995; Demery and Squire 1996; Dercon 2000; Christiaensen et al. 2002; Chen and Ravallion 2004) . Moreover, the literature examining the impact of trade liberalisation on households (McCulloch 2001; Winters et al. 2004 ) offers a variety of methodologies to track the pathways through which exogenous shocks affect households, as well as appropriate methods to estimate the effects.
In choosing a suitable framework, studies typically identify four features: the nature of the exogenous shock or policy change; its impact on the prices of goods and factors; how households respond to these price changes; and the resulting effect on outcomes such as welfare, poverty rates or child labour. For example, Friedman and Levinsohn (2001) measure the impact of the 1997 Indonesian Financial crisis on household welfare by calculating the compensating variations i.e. the amount of income required to get the household back to their pre-crisis utility. Given that the East Asian crisis caused the collapse of the Indonesian Rupiah, leading to high inflation, the paper concentrates on the welfare impact of increasing goods prices. The authors account for each household's exposure to price rises by weighting price changes by the composition of the household's consumption basket. Changing goods prices are likely to affect the demand for goods as households reallocate consumption, while changing factor prices may influence labour supply and other factor endowments. They account for such responses by calculating demand elasticities using regional variation in prices (Deaton 1990) . Doing so does not change the qualitative story about the impact of the crisis, but does significantly reduce the size of the impact.
If one measures welfare changes through the impact of a shock on prices, it is important to take into account the fact that some households may gain from price increases. Thus Friedman and Levinsohn incorporate income increases due to rising prices by treating production of a good as a negative expenditure in their estimates of consumption. They show that price increases had a large distributional impact in rural areas where income from agricultural production is a large component of total income. However, this approach is not completely satisfactory for a country such a Zambia where 35 per cent of the population of the population live in urban areas and rely predominantly on wage income. If a shock is very sudden, then it may be reasonable to suppose that there is little chance for nominal wages to adjust; but where, as here, we are considering the impact of multiple shocks over a longer period, it is important to take into account wage adjustments. Porto (2005 and 2006) and Nicita (2009) achieve this in their estimations of the welfare changes after trade liberalisation, by using a farm household model that includes the impact of tradable goods prices on wages. Although our Zambian data does not permit us to do this as precisely as they do, we also attempt to incorporate the impact of changing goods prices on wages in estimating welfare changes.
We therefore examine three channels through which prices affect welfare: consumption expenditure, household agricultural production and wage income. In Zambia, including the potential benefits of price rises on agricultural production and wages is necessary given the importance of farm income for rural households and wage income for urban households. The welfare change for a household is derived from the indirect utility function of the standard agricultural household model:
where household utility, U, is a function of a vector of prices, P, and total outlay, x. Assuming the usual conditions on labour supply hold, (i.e. flexible labour markets and perfect substitution between household and brought in labour) household production and consumption decisions are separable and so a first-order approximation to the change in welfare for household h is:
The first term represents the welfare change from consumption expenditure. Consumption of own farm produce and food given in-kind make up a sizeable portion of total household Consumption Wage Agricultural prod change change change consumption so are treated as negative expenditure shares in order to account for the increasing opportunity cost of these resources when prices rise. A further complication is that many rural households own their own dwellings, whereas many urban households have to rent accommodation. Theoretically we should credit homeowners with a welfare gain when rents rise because of the rising opportunity cost of housing services. However, it is debatable whether homeowners in Zambia would have been able to capitalise on the potential gains from rising rental prices. We therefore also examine welfare changes, which do not include rent as a negative expenditure for homeowners.
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The welfare impact of wage growth, the second term, enters into the equation positively signifying a welfare gain when wages rise. Ideally wage and earnings growth could be calculated empirically by comparing the 2005 and 2008 Labour Force Surveys, but the data for the latter survey was not made available. In principle, earnings data is also available from the quarterly Earnings and Employment Survey conducted amongst registered firms -but the changes recorded in this dataset over this period are completely implausible.
We therefore adopt a simple sensitivity analysis of the results with respect to two very different assumptions about wages: that they did not rise at all in nominal terms; and that they rose exactly in line with provincial inflation. 2 The former assumption represents a plausible worse case for the change in welfare since it is extremely unlikely that wages did not respond at all to prices over the period. Conversely, assuming that wages rose in line with inflation is probably optimistic, given the rapid inflation of 2008 and the financial crisis in 2009. Thus these assumptions almost certainly bracket the true effect.
The final term in equation 2 represents the welfare change associated with changes in agricultural income resulting from the price changes experienced. Prices changes of 22 goods were matched to the 24 farm income sources recorded in the household survey data. By using shares of income (i.e. revenue minus costs) to weight the price changes we implicitly assume that inputs experience the same percentage change in prices as outputs. If the price of farm inputs, such as fertiliser, rose faster than the price of agricultural outputs, then our calculations may overestimate the welfare gains from price increases. 3 Finally, although we have tried to incorporate the largest sources of welfare change into our calculations, we nonetheless recognise that our estimates are incomplete. In particular, they exclude the welfare effects of changes to other income streams, such as non-farm business income, returns to savings and remittances. Unfortunately, our data provide us with no empirical basis for estimating how these income sources may have been affected at the household level. Nor, unfortunately, can we consider the welfare impact of reduced demand for labour resulting from the financial crisis. Although we know that there were significant redundancies in the 1 We also conducted our analysis including rent as a negative expenditure. The results are qualitatively the same, although, predominantly rural, homeowners gain more. 2 Province level inflation figures were constructed from the CPI using a basket of 357 goods. This was done by first combining the prices into 8 categories of commodity and then constructing a Laspeyres index weighted by commodity shares from 1994 for each province. 3 The analysis also implicitly assumes that buyers and sellers of agricultural commodities face a single local market price and households buy and sell the same quality of agricultural produce. Unfortunately the data do not permit more nuanced assumptions. mining sector in certain locations, we have no credible basis for allocating the reduced risk of employment, since we have no information on the characteristics of those that were made redundant. Our calculations therefore probably underestimate the welfare losses experienced in some areas, particularly the Copperbelt. Nevertheless, we believe that our approach provides, at least, an initial indication of the relative magnitude of the welfare changes experienced by different groups of Zambian households based on the best data available.
Data
In order to estimate welfare changes we match household data on consumption and farm income to the price changes of goods at the most detailed possible level of regional and product disaggregation. For the income and consumption data we use the 2006 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS V) the most recent nationally representative household survey available for Zambia prior to the onset of the financial crisis. 4 The 2006 LCMS covers all 72 districts in Zambia, sampling over 18,000 households stratified into 8 different categories of rural and urban household.
District level price changes for commodities were taken from the Zambian CPI data, which covers just over half of the districts in Zambia. For districts without price data, the commodity prices of the closest district by road with price data were used as a proxy. This is likely to be a suitable approximation if heterogeneity between districts is small (if, for example, households closer by road share suppliers and have similar patterns of consumption). However, it could either exaggerate or underestimate the price changes if there is high regional price variation. For some goods, the coverage of districts is much sparser, perhaps reflecting differences in regional consumption baskets. Where this was the case, province level prices were used, calculated as the population weighted average of available district prices in a province. In a few cases, the national average price was used where the province price could not be constructed.
Our results present estimated changes in welfare for December 2007 , 2008 relative to December 2006 , the month of the LCMS survey. We use the same month each year to try and minimise the effects of seasonality on our results. Zambian households face seasonality in prices for both food and non food items resulting from fluctuations in agricultural production and increases in the cost of utilities and rent (Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection 2006). 
Results
We present our results in three sections. First we describe the price shocks experienced by Zambian households between 2006 and 2009 and the proximate causes of these changes. Second, we describe the expenditure patterns and income sources of Zambian households which influence the way in which they have been affected by these price changes. Finally, we present our calculations of welfare changes over the period using the methodology described above. Overall prices indices can mask large variations in the underlying prices, so it is useful to examine the price changes of some key goods, services and factors. 
Price
Expenditure shares
The impact on individual households of the price changes described above depends heavily on how important the goods and services are in household consumption. Conversely, most rural households are in the bottom three quintiles. Food shares are markedly higher for these quintiles. Breaking down expenditure shares by strata, Table 5 .3 shows that small-and medium-scale farms have the highest food shares ( 67 and 63 percent) reflecting the high share of own produce in their consumption. 6 Non-agricultural rural households have a somewhat lower food share (55 per cent) as they rely on food purchases, while large-scale farmers have a much smaller food share (46 per cent) because they have the highest income of all groups and so spend more on non-food items. Moreover, compared to urban households, large farmers mostly own their homes and so are unaffected by rent increases.
In urban areas, the food share of expenditure is much lower, primarily because of substantially higher rent and energy costs. However, households living in low cost housing areas had a much higher food share (46 per cent) than those living in high cost areas (31 per cent), as well as much lower overall expenditure, suggesting that they were more vulnerable to the food price increases in 2008.
Of course, knowledge of expenditure shares does not translate directly into vulnerability. For agricultural households, the overall welfare change resulting from food price increases depends on whether the households are net producers or consumers of food. Households that produce more than they consume are likely to be resilient to food price increases, since they can consume their own produce, and may benefit from increased revenue from farming sales. Their overall welfare also depends on changes in production costs and the significance of agricultural income in overall household income. Conversely, non-agricultural households are likely to be adversely affected by food price rises, but these increases may be offset by increases in wages and business revenue.
6 The Zambian Central Statistical Office records four rural strata and three urban ones. The four rural strata are: small, medium, and large farmer -where size is determined by the size of the area under crop, the number and type of livestock and poultry owned by household -and non-agricultural households, who do not privately engage in agricultural activities. In urban areas, the three strata are low, medium, and high cost housing areas, based on the CSO's residential classification system. For more details see CSO Zambia (2007). Income sources Table 5 .4 shows the share of households in different quintiles receiving income from a variety of sources, as well as the percentage of income they obtain from these sources. Interestingly, the majority of households in every quintile, except the top quintile, received some income from farming, and even in the top quintile, almost half of the households received some farming income. However, the importance of farming income varies dramatically by quintile, with more than two-thirds of income in the bottom quintile coming from farming, compared to less than 10 per cent for those in the top quintile.
Conversely, the share of households with wage income rises sharply with income. Almost none of the bottom quintile receive wage income, whereas almost two-thirds of the top quintile do and wage income constitutes over half of all the income received by the top quintile. The preponderance and importance of non-farm business income also increases with per capita expenditure, constituting almost a quarter of income for the top quintile. Income from remittances and from financial assets is also more common among the better off, although neither income source constitute more than around 10 per cent of income for any quintile.
The distribution of incomes sources across quintiles has important implications for the impact of price changes on welfare. In particular, the higher share of income from farming in the lower quintiles suggests that they are more likely to gain from food price increases. Conversely, welfare changes in the upper quintiles are likely to be sensitive to the assumptions made regarding wage changes. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 break down income sources by rural and urban strata. Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of rural households receive income from farming. However, small and mediumscale farmers are significantly diversified. Indeed, small-scale farmers only receive 42 per cent of their income from farming, with 36 per cent coming from wages and non-farm businesses. Non-agricultural households in rural areas receive 70 per cent of their income from these two sources.
In urban areas, wage income dominates, constituting more than 60 per cent of income for those in medium and high-cost housing in urban areas. But here also, income sources are diversified, particularly for those in low cost housing areas who receive over a quarter of their income from non-farm businesses.
This pattern of income sources suggests that the key beneficiaries of food price increases are likely to be large farmers, because 85 per cent of their income comes from this source. Similarly, welfare changes for those in urban areas will be sensitive to assumed changes in wages. It also suggests that our estimates of welfare changes for urban households and for nonagricultural households in rural areas may be downwards biased, since increases in non-farm business income resulting from price rises are not included in our estimates of welfare changes. Similarly, income from remittances, assets, borrowing and savings are important sources for a small fraction of households, but since there is no data on returns to these income sources during the period they are omitted from our estimates of welfare change. Our results show that price increases in Zambia since 2006 had extremely divergent impacts on households depending on whether they were net producers or consumers of food. In our simulation, the majority of rural households, as net food producers, experienced a gain in welfare since 2006 due to the rising value of their agricultural produce. By the end of 2008, this gain amounted to 7 per cent of total household expenditure, although the slowing of food inflation and higher non-food inflation during 2009 reduced this gain to 3 per cent by the end of that year (Table 5 .7). These welfare gains increase if one assumes that wages rose in line with provincial inflation, but the difference is small because, as noted above, wages constitute a relatively small share of rural household income.
By contrast, urban households, who are overwhelmingly net food consumers, suffered a large loss in welfare between December 2006 and 2009 (Figure 5.4 ). This was due to both higher food and non-food costs. In the full wage adjustment scenario, the decline in welfare was still present over the period for urban households, but less severe. However, wage adjustments did not completely offset losses from inflation, because wages only constitute between 47-65 per cent of income for these households. In both wage scenarios the sharpest drop in welfare was in 2008.
In spite of lower food and fuel prices, urban households continued to lose in 2009, notably because of higher rent and electricity costs.
Because the change in welfare varied between significant gains and substantial losses for different households, the national welfare change showed contrasting accounts of the overall welfare trend depending on the assumptions made about wage increases. If one assumes that wages did not rise over the period, then overall welfare in Zambia improved by 0.7 per cent in the year to December 2007, but then fell sharply in the subsequent two years due to the heavy losses experienced by urban households ( When households are categorised by strata, the relationship between agricultural production and welfare appears even stronger (Table 5 .8). All categories of farming household benefit from food price increases, the larger-scale farmers gaining more because of their concentration of income from this source. Rural non-agricultural households and all categories of urban households saw continual falls in welfare throughout the period. Table 5 .9 disaggregates the welfare changes into those arising from the consumption expenditure term in equation 2 and those due to increases in agricultural income, for the zero wage growth case. Agricultural households fared better than non-agricultural households on both these components of welfare change. Not only did they receive a much larger increase in income from farm sales, but they were also more resilient on the consumption side because of their consumption of own produced food. Medium and large farms benefited much more than small farms from the rising price of food, as they are more dependent on farm income. However, smaller farms benefited slightly more than large farms on the consumption side, reflecting the larger share of own produce consumed by small farmers, as well as their smaller share of nonfood expenditure. Non-agricultural households fared better than urban households in the static wage scenario, since they depended less on wage income than urban households. However, when wages are adjusted for inflation, low and medium cost urban households were better off compared to rural nonagricultural households.
The 28.4 per cent of Zambian households living in urban low cost housing areas were the worst affected in all three years since they were hit by both food and non-food price increases (see Figures 5.6 and 5.7). They spent more of their income on staple food and poultry compared to other urban households, making them vulnerable to food price increases. Moreover, the majority of low cost houses (68 per cent) are in Lusaka and the Copperbelt, which saw the highest price increases. Households in low cost urban areas also benefited far less from wage increases than medium and high cost households since they are less dependent on wage income. The importance of the net producer position of a household on welfare is further illustrated in Figure 5 .8. There is a strong positive relationship between the welfare change and the net producer position. 7 When the net production position is zero, the average welfare change in 2008 is 1.7 per cent, as the benefit from wage growth marginally outweighs the welfare costs of rises of non food prices. Note: Net production is defined as total food production minus total food consumption as a proportion of total expenditure
We also explore the welfare changes by expenditure quintile. Tables 5.10 and 5.11 show the welfare changes for the zero wage growth and inflation wage growth assumptions. For rural expenditure quintiles, welfare improved more for households in the bottom four quintiles than in the top quintile when we assume static wages. However, this ceases to hold when wages are adjusted for inflation, reflecting the greater proportion of wage income in the higher quintiles. Notwithstanding this, the welfare gains in rural areas appear to be reasonably evenly spread across the quintiles.
The same is not true for urban expenditure quintiles. Households in the top urban quintile were less affected than those in lower quintiles when zero wage growth is assumed. When wages are adjusted to inflation, these welfare losses increase significantly towards the lower end of the distribution; if this assumption is correct, then it was the poorest urban households that were hardest hit by prices changes over the period.
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Breaking down the welfare changes by province shows that the Copperbelt and Lusaka experienced the highest welfare losses, consistent with their large urban populations (Table  5 .12). Luapula, Eastern and North Western provinces, which have high ratios of rural to urban households, saw the largest welfare improvements. 
Robustness Tests
To ensure that our welfare estimates are not driven by erroneous data and are robust to different approaches to constructing household welfare, we undertook a set of robustness checks.
Erroneous values in the relatively sparse district level prices could be amplified by our welfare calculations affecting the validity of the overall result. To address this, we estimated welfare changes using province level median prices for each good instead of district prices. This made little difference to the overall results.
Our calculations might be affected by extreme outliers in our data. However, when we recalculated our estimates excluding the 0.1 per cent of extreme values of prices, our results did not change.
There were also concerns that, although shares of agricultural income may be accurate in the data, the total level of income may be under reported. We therefore recalculated shares of agricultural income using total expenditure as the denominator, but this did not change our overall result.
It is common practice in welfare estimates to include the inputed gain to homeowners from increasing rental rates (Friedman and Levinsohn 2002) . As we argue above, we do not believe that homeowners in Zambia are in a position to benefit from rental increases and we therefore do not include them in our calculations. If we do include this benefit for homeowners, our results do change, with welfare gains 4 per cent higher over the period. However, the trend and distribution of impact remains largely the same.
Conclusions
Given the wide range of shocks experienced by Zambia from December 2006 until the end of 2009, our conclusions are surprisingly clear cut. The rapid increase in food and non-food prices, particularly during 2008, had a major negative welfare impact on urban households. This was because most urban households in Zambia are significant net consumers of food. It is not clear to what extent these welfare losses were compensated by wage increases and increases in other sources of income. However, simulations which adjust wages for inflation fail to compensate for the welfare losses associated with the price rises. This is particularly true for the poorest urban households, whose share of wages in income is much lower than that of better off urban households.
By contrast, most rural households are net producers of food and so probably gained from the increases in food prices. Although they were also negatively affected by increases in non-food prices, particularly in 2009, the overall effect for rural households was positive, particularly for medium and large scale farming households. However, non-agricultural households in rural areas lost, as their losses from higher consumption costs were not compensated by higher agricultural income.
In aggregate, Zambian households gained from the price changes that occurred in 2007 and 2008, but the rise in key non-food prices in 2009 pulled aggregate welfare slightly below the level of December 2006. However, the sharp polarisation of impact between rural and urban areas, and between agricultural and non-agricultural activities in rural areas, makes an aggregate 'national' picture very misleading.
Although we have undertaken our estimates using the best data available, we are conscious that they are subject to significant weaknesses. Three problems in particular stand out. We have no good quality evidence on what has happened to wages or employment during this period; we have no nationally representative data on agricultural input prices over time; and we have no data at all on changes in other sources of income, most notably income from non-farm enterprises. These make our estimates of welfare changes subject to significant uncertainty. If the prices of agricultural inputs rose much faster than those of outputs, it is possible that the welfare gains for farmers may have been much less than this analysis suggests. Conversely, if urban households running non-farm enterprises were able to raise their prices in line with inflation, the negative welfare impact on urban households would be much reduced. Perhaps our most important conclusion, therefore, is to emphasise the need for systematic and regular collection of good quality data, not only on expenditures and prices, but also on wages and business income. Without these, policymakers and academics alike have a rather weak base on which to estimate the effects of external shocks and formulate domestic policy reforms.
